INTRODUCTION
Judicial decorum, propriety and discipline require that one should not ignore it. Our system of administration of justice aims at certainty in the law and that can be achieved only if Judges do not ignore decisions by Courts of coordinate authority or of superior authority 1. The Supreme Court’s split verdict in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India 2 , which addressed the constitutional validity of Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, raises important concerns of judicial discipline. This article examines whether the Court ought to have exercised judicial restraint, given the pendency of multiple references before the Chief Justice of India seeking constitution of a larger bench to decide identical and closely related questions arising from Section 17A.
SCOPE AND BACKGROUND OF SECTION 17A OF THE PC ACT
The provision mandates a previous sanction from the respective authorities for commencing enquiry, inquiry or investigation into an offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant under this Act, where the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant in discharge of his official functions or duties. The provision came into force on 26.07.2018, soon after Manju Surana v. Sunil Arora 3 , wherein the apex court expressed doubt in the ratio in Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa 4 that mandated a previous sanction under section 19 of the act for commencing an investigation under the order of the magistrate under section 156(3) Cr.P.C and thereby referred the case for consideration by a larger bench, whereby, it is currently pending consideration by the Chief Justice of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore, it is apposite to analyse and understand section 17A in the backdrop of M.K. Aiyappa and Manju Surana.
PENDING REFERENCES CONCERNING SECTION 17A OF THE PC ACT
In Nara Chandrababu Naidu v. The State of Andhra Pradesh &Anr 5 , inter alia, the apex court failed to reach a consensus regarding the requirement of section 17A sanction for offences alleged to have been committed before the incorporation of section 17A by the amendment in 2018. Justice Bela M Trivedi was of the view that Section 17A would be applicable to the offences under the PC Act as amended by the Amendment Act, 2018, and not to the offences existing prior to the said amendment. Even otherwise, absence of an approval as contemplated in Section 17A for conducting enquiry, inquiry or investigation of the offences alleged to have been committed by a public servant in purported exercise of his official functions or duties, would neither vitiate the proceedings nor would be a ground to quash the proceedings or the FIR registered against such public servant, per-contra, Justice Aniruddha Bose fashioned his opinion to hold that an enquiry, inquiry or investigation into the commission of an act by the public servant under the PC Act after section 17A has become operational which is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken in discharge of his public duty, previous approval mandated under section 17A is to be obtained and in absence of such previous approval, the action initiated under the 1988 Act shall be held illegal. Thereby, the matter was referred to the Chief Justice seeking to constitute a larger bench to finally settle the legal conundrum. Subsequently, in B.S. Yeddiyurappa v. A Alam Pasha & Ors 6 , the Supreme Court framed several substantial questions of law concerning Section 17A and its interplay with Section 19 of the PC Act. These included the nature of considerations governing approval under Section 17A, its relationship with Magistrate-directed investigations under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., and whether the 2018 amendments are substantive or procedural—and consequently, whether they have retrospective effect. However, the Court refrained from answering these questions, noting that a coordinate bench had already referred similar issues concerning Section 19 to the Chief Justice. The matter was accordingly directed to be placed before the Chief Justice for appropriate orders, including the possibility of tagging it with other pending references before a larger bench encompassing the spirit of judicial discipline and propriety.
CONCLUSION
Judicial discipline and propriety are the two significant facets of administration of justice. Every court is obliged to adhere to these principles to ensure hierarchical discipline on the one hand and proper dispensation of justice on the other. The adjudication of the constitutional validity of Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, despite the pendency of multiple references on substantially similar issues, presents a troubling departure from established principles of judicial discipline. When questions of law are already referred for authoritative determination by a larger bench, judicial propriety demands restraint from parallel or premature adjudication by coordinate benches. Moreover, a consolidated consideration of the issues surrounding Section 17A by a larger bench would have ensured doctrinal clarity, judicial economy, and institutional consistency. While the failure to bring the pendency of related references to the Court’s attention appears inadvertent, the episode underscores the critical importance of adherence to judicial decorum in maintaining the coherence and credibility of constitutional adjudication.
About the author
Adv. Akhil George
Adv. Gajendra Singh Rajpurohit
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